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According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kansas, (Southern Department, W. D.,) a person may erect a
Adjoining
high board fence upon his own land, or on the
Landowners, division line, though by doing so he interferes
Light and Air, with the light and air of a building on an adjoinFence on
ing lot, especially when the fence would not have
Division Lin
interfered with the light and air, if the building
had been placed near the centre of the lot ; for the law aims
to protect each person in the enjoyment of his own property:
Trplett v.Jackson, 48 Pac. Rep. 931.
In England, by what is known as the doctrine of ancient
lights, twenty years uninterrupted enjoyment gives the owner
of a building a prescriptive right to the light and air coming
to his windows over the land of another: Act 2 & 3 Wm. 4,
c. 7I; Darwin v. Upton, 2 Saund. 175 C, 1786; Younge v.
Shaper, 27 L. T. N. S. 643, 1872; Flight v. Thomas, 8 Cl. &
F. 231, 1841; Tapling v. Jones, II H. L. Cas. 29o, 1865;
Simper v. Foley, 2 J. & H. 555, 1862 ; Ladyman v. Grave, 6
L. R. Ch. 763. 187I ; Kelk v. Pearson, 6 L. R. Ch. 8o9, 1871;
City of London Brewery Co. v. Tennant, 9 L. R. Ch. 212,
1873; Mitchell v. Cantill, 37 Ch. D. 56, 1887; Robson v.
Edwards, [1893] 2, Ch. 146, 1893; Martin v. Price, [1894]
I Ch. 276, 1893; Jenks v. Viscount Qz'fden, [1897] i Ch. 694,
1897.
But this rule has met with little favor in the United States,
being rejected by most courts: Ray v. Lynes, io Ala. 63,
1846; Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500, 1861; Western Granite
& Marble Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. III, 1894;
Ingrahan v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584, 1818; Goodwin v.
Hanersley, (Conn.) 36 Atl. Rep. lO65, 1897; fulley v.
Security Tnst Co., 5 Del. Ch. 578, 1885 ; Turner v. Thompson,
58 Ga. 268, 1877; Keiperv. Klen, 5I Ind. 316, 1875; Stein
v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 1877; Morrisonv. Marquardt,24 Iowa,
35, 1867; Ray v. Sweeney, 14 Bush, (Ky.) i, 1878; Oldstein
v. Fireman's Bldg. Assn., 44 La. An. 492, 1892; Pierre v.
Fernald,26 Me. 436, 1847; Cherry v. Stein, II Md. I, 1858 ;
Rogers v. Sawin, io Gray, (Mass.) 376, 1858; Richardson v.
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Pond, 15 Gray, (Mass.) 387, i86o; Keats v. Hugo, I1
Mass. 204, 1874; King v. Miller, 8 N. J. Eq. 559, 1851;
Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N. J. Eq. 217, 1879; Parkerv. Foote,
19 Wend. (N. Y.) 309, 1838; Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432,
439, 1876; Knabe v. Levelle, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 818, 1892;
Lindsey v. First Nat!. Bk., 115 N. C. 553, 1894; JMullen v.
Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135, 1869; Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts, (Pa.)
327, 331, 1834; McDonald v. Bromey, 6 Phila. (Pa.) 302,
1867; Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Pa. 293, 1858; Rennyson's Appeal,
94 Pa. 147, 188o; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. L. (S. Car.)
311, 1852; Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. (Sup.) 232, i86o;
Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295, i86o; Powell v. Sims, 5 W
Va. 1, 1871 ; though it was adopted in a few early cases: U. S.
v. Appleton, I Summ. (U. S.) 492, 1833; Clawso-. v. Primrose,
4 Del. Ch. 643, 1873; Gerbcrv. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 1854;
Manier v. Myers, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 514, I844; Taylor v.
Boulware, 35 La. An. 469, 1883; Story v. Odin, 12 Mass.
157, 1815 ; Robesonv.Pittenger, 2 N.J.Eq. 57, 1838; Lampman v. Milks, 21 N.Y. 505, 511, 186o; McCready v. Th/omson,
Dudley, (S. Car.) 131, 1837; Berkeley v. Smith, 27 Gratt.
(Va.) 892, 1876.

Accordingly, it is the general rule that, no matter what his.
motive, whether for his own benefit, or out of pure malice to
his neighbor,, one may erect any structure he pleases on his
own land, though it obstructs the light coming to his neighbor's windows, and renders the latter's house uninhabitableWestern Granite & Marble Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. i iI,
1894; Lapere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. 534, 188o; Triplett v.
Jackson, (Kan.) 48 Pac. Rep. 931, 1897; Letts v. Kessler,
54 Ohio St. 73, 1896, reversing 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. lO8, 1892.
But the courts of Michigan hold, with better justice, that
such an erection, if malicious, will be enjoined, not on the
ground of interference with any right of light and air, but on
the ground that it is a nuisance: Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich.
38o, 1888; Flahertyv. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 1890; Kirkwood
v. Finegan, 95 Mich. 543, 1893.
Such an erection will be enjoined, however, if it is on the
division line; for it then interferes with the plaintiff's rights:
Western Granite & Marble Co. v. Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. i i i,
1894; Peck v. Roe, (Mich.) 67 N. W. Rep. io8o, 1896;
contra, Triplett v. Jackson, (Kan.) 48 Pac. Rep. 931, 1897 ;
and a fortiori, it will be enjoined, if it is on the land of the
plaintiff: Sankey v. St. Mary's Female Academy, 8 Mont. 265,.
1889.
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An agreement by an attorney at lav to undertake the
conduct of a litigation on his own account, to pay the costs
Attorney and and expenses thereof, and to receive as his
Client,
compensation a portion of the proceeds of the
Champerty
thing recovered, is champertous and void: Peck v.
Henrict, (Supreme Court of the United States,) 17 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 927.
In a case recently decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Carson v. Vicksbnrg Bank, 22 So. Rep. i, a member of
a beneficial association, (the Knights of Pythias,)
Beneficial
Association,
surrendered his certificate of membership, in which
his wife was named as beneficiary, and took out
Insurance,
Beneficiaries another, ostensibly for the benefit of a brother
knight, which he could do under the laws of the order, but
really for the benefit of a creditor, which he could not do.
On the death of the assured, the creditor brought suit to
determine the application of the proceeds of the certificate;
and the court held that the wife could not claim under the
former certificate, as it had been cancelled by the surrender,
but that the person named as beneficiary was a naked trustee
for the wife and children of the assured, who were therefore
entitled to the fund.
The same court has lately held, that when a mutual benefit
association pays the amount of a certificate of insurance to a
bank, leaving the court to determine who is the
Change of
rightful claimant of the fund, it thereby waives a
failure of the member assured to change the beneficiary in the words provided by the rules of the order; and
that consequently, when a member of such an order, intending
to change the beneficiary, wrote the name of the new beneficiary
in a book belonging to his agent, and, owing to physical
inability, wrote nothing further, but gave full verbal instructions
to him, the certificate not being indorsed because it was then
in possession of the lodge, it would be treated in equity as a
complete change in the beneficiary, though not made in
accordance with the rules of the lodge: Hall v. Allen, 22 So.
Rep. 4.
A member of a railroad relief association, who has been
injured and taken to the hospital of the association, for medical
treatment, pursuant to its constitution and by-laws,
cannot, norcan his personal representatives, recover
Action by
Alember
for injuries or death due to neglect or maltreatment
while in the hospital: Martin v. Northern Pacific Beneficial
Assn., (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 71 N. W. Rep. 701.
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In a recent case before Romer, J., of the Chancery Division,
Raffety v. Schofield, [1897] i Ch. 937, it was stipulated in a
building agreement that the defendant should
Building
erect certain buildings and carry out certain
Agreement,
Landlord and works on the plaintiff's land, within a specified
tenant,
time, and should " forthwith proceed " with and
Option to
Purchase,
Breach of

Condtion

complete the works, when a lease for ninety-nine
years was to be granted to him. The agreement
provided that if the defendant did not perform the

several stipulations therein contained, the plaintiff might by
notice in writing determine the agreement and re-enter, and
also contained an option to the defendant to purchase the
freehold. The plaintiff, becoming dissatisfied with the slow
progress made by the defendant, gave him notice to determine
the agreement; but the defendant, having previously given
notice to the plaintiff of his intention to exercise the option to
purchase, declined to surrender possession. The plaintiffthen
brought suit to restrain the defendant from trespassing on or
interfering with the plaintiff's possession of the land. The
trial judge held that, on the evidence, the defendant had
made default in not "forthwith proceeding" to carry out the
stipulations of the agreement, but that as there was no condition precedent that the defendant should not have committed
any breach of the conditions contained in the building agreement, the option to purchase was well exercised, and a binding contract was thereby made for the sale and purchase of the
property; that the determination of the leasing part of the
building agreement by the notice given to the defendant for
breach of its conditions did not destroy or affect the contract
for sale created by the exercise of the option to purchase;
and that the plaintiff's action must therefore be dismissed.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately held,
that the fourth section of the interstate commerce act, which
prohibits a greater charge for a shorter than for a
Carriers,
Interstate longer haul over the same line in the same direcCommerce tion, applies, in respect of railroad transportation,
Law,
only to the carriage by rail ; and when the propLong and
Short Haul,
erty has been discharged. from the company's
Delivery
cars at the place of destination, without any
greater charge for the shorter haul, the obligations of the
company under that section are fulfilled, and it is no violation
thereof for the company to furnish free cartage to the stores
or business houses of the consignees, though by so doing the
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total cost of
than that for
Detroit, G. H.
74 Fed. Rep.

delivery for the shorter haul is made greater
the longer : Interstate Commerce Commission v.
& N. Ry. Co., 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 986, affirming
803.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently ruled,
that though lands in another state are subject
to the collateral inheritance tax imposed by the
laws of the testator's domicile, if converted by
Devise of
Land in
the will at the time of his death, they will not
Foreign
be so subject, when a time in the future is speci-

Collateral
Inheritance
Tax,

Jurisdiction,
Equitable
Conversion

fled for the sale of the lands, or when the direction to sell is merely permissive: Zn re Handley's
Estate, 37 Atl. Rep. 587.
According to a late decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, an agreement between several fire insurance cornof persons
Conspiracy, panies to delegate to an association
the power to prescribe premium rates, and to
Trust and
Combine,
abide by the rates so fixed, is a "trust and comInsurance
bine," within Code Miss. 1892, § 4437, sub-d. g.,
Companies defining a trust and combine
as an agreement
between several persons or corporations to place the control
" of business," to any extent, "in the power of trustees, by
whatever name called: " American Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 22
So. Rep. 99. See Beeciley v. Mulville, (Iowa,) 70 N. W. Rep.
107, 1897; 36 Am. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 255.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has upheld a statute,
(Act. Ark. March 25, 1889,) which provides that "whenever
any corporation or person engaged in the business
Constltuof operating or constructing any railroad or railtional Law,
Equal
road bridge, shall discharge, with or without
Protection,
cause, or refuse to further employ, any servant or
Railroads,
Non-payment employe thereof, the unpaid wages of each serof Employes, vant or employe then earned at the contract rate,
Penalty
without abatement or deduction, shall be and
become due and payable, on the day of such discharge or
refusal to longer employ, and if the same be not paid on such
day, then, as a penalty for such non-payment, the wages of
such servant or employe shall continue at the same rate until
paid: provided, such wages shall not continue more than sixty
days, unless an action therefor shall be commenced within
that time; " refusing to declare it unconstitutional, on the
ground that the damages allowed as a penalty for non-pay-
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ment were unreasonable or excessive, or that it denied the
"equal protection of the laws," within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the particular class of corporations to which it applied: St. Louis, I H. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Paul,40 S. W. Rep. 705.

The Circuit Court for the District of Indiana has recently
ruled, that in an action to recover the penalty for violation of
Contract
Labor Laws,

Action to
Recover

Penalty,
Declaration

the contract labor laws, a declaration is insuffi-

cient, if it fails to show the character of the labor
which the immigrant was to perform, or, at least

inimgatpro,
in substance, the terms of the contract under
which he came to this country; and also if it fails

to allege definitely that he actually came here pursuant to the
contract, or to set forth the acts done by the defendant to
assist or procure his immigration : United States v. Gay, 8o
Fed. Rep. -254.

In an action by a passenger against two railroad companies
for injuries caused by a collision between their trains, neither
Contribution, defendant is entitled to judgment over against
the other, in any event, since the plaintiff is
Joint Tort.
lfesors,

Railroad

entitled to judgment

against either defendant

only on showing that its negligence contributed to
Companies
the accident; and, if the defendants were jointly
negligent, there can be no contribution between them, since
each was an independent agent: Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Vance, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 41 S. W. Rep. 167.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has re-enunciated several
principles of corporation law, which are of frequent applicaCorporations, tion, i. e., (i) that the president of a corporaMeetings,
tion cannot adjourn a meeting of the stockAdjournment,
Rightto Vote

holders without day, against their will; (2) That
if he attempts to do so, and refuses to preside or

to permit the meeting to be continued in the office of the
company, the stockholders may adjourn, without him, to
another room, and there hold their meeting; (3) That at a
stockholders' meeting, the right to determine the validity and
ownership of stock, and the right to vote thereon, is not vested
in the president alone; (4)That stockholders may transact at
an adjourned meeting any business that might have lawfully
been transacted at the original meeting; and (5)That the
stockholders may elect directors when the shares of stock
stand on the books of the company in the name of trustees,
without the names of the cestuis que trust being indicated,
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though it is provided by statute that the names of the cestuis
que trust of stock shall be placed upon the book of the corporation: State v. Croran, 49 Pac. Rep. 41.
In a case recently before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
McElroy v. Minnesota Percheron Horse Co., 71 N. W. Rep.
652, it appeared that the president of a corporaOne-man
Company,
tion owned all the stock except six shares kept in
Acts of
the names of officers to render them eligible to
President
office. The board of directors consisted of himself, his relatives, and one employe. He had managed the
corporate affairs for five years without any objection by the
stockholders or directors, and during this time the only meet-ing held was for the purpose of electing new directors in the:
place of others who had resigned. The president had also.
for two years been negotiating a sale of the property of the
corporation. Under these circumstances it was held that a
contract for the sale of all the assets of the corporation, consisting of real estate, made by the president alone, was binding
on the corporation, since all the powers of a corporation, vested
solely in the board of directors, may be conferred upon the
president or other officers by implication arising from the wayin which the corporation has directed its affairs, or suffered
them to be conducted.
According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a nonresident alien is not entitled to the benefit of the
Death by
WrongfulAct, Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, which gives a
Non-resident right of action to certain members of the family of
Allen
one whose death is caused by the wrongful act
of another: Deniv. Penna. R. R. Co., 37 Atl. Rep. 558.

The Supreme Court of Nevada has recently made havoc of
the ballots cast at an election, holding illegal the following :
those marked with a cross in the blank space for
Elections,
Ballots,
presidential electors under the words "Vote for
Marking
three," and not opposite the name of any candidate; those marked with a cross after the names of presidential electors, placed in a square made by the voter; those
marked with a cross after the name of an officer to be elected
for another township; those marked with a cross madewith a purple instead of a black pencil; those disfigured by a
partially erased cross; those with the word "canceled"
written on the back thereof with ink; those marked with a.
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mark more like a spider than anything else; those marked
with three lines forming a star; those marked with crosses
forming a star; those marked with crosses beneath the names
of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates; those
marked with a cross in a vacant square not opposite the
name of any candidate; and those marked with a cross
between the names of two candidates, so that it was impossible
to determine for which the voter intended to vote; but
graciously permitted those which bore an irregular pencil
mark, clearly made by accident, to be counted. It also
held that as the ballot law provided for a perforated line
from the top to the bottom of the ballot, that the number on
the ballot should be the same as on the corresponding stub,
that the ballots should be bound in stub-books, and that the
ballot officer should detach the slip from the ticket, the
failure of the election officer to detach the stub bearing the
number of the ballot, and the voting of the ticket with the
stub attached, rendered the ballot void, on the ground that:
"It was equally the duty of the voter to know the stub was
detached, that the ballot bore the water-mark, and had
attached thereto the strip on the right-hand side bearing the
number. He had the means of knowing these facts, and
should be held to exercise some intelligence and some diligence in casting his ballot. When he blindly accepts a ballot
from an election officer bearing marks that will destroy the
secrecy of the ballot, he should be held to know that fact:"
Sweeney v. Hjul, 48 Pac. Rep. 1036.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has very sensibly
ruled that when a ballot has upon it the name of an individual,
but does not disclose the office voted for, and it
appears that he was a candidate for the office of
alderman and no other, and that no one else of the same name
was a candidate for any office at that election, the ballot will
be construed as a vote for that person for alderman: State v.
Mahncke, 41 S. W. Rep. 185.
According to a late decision of the Court of Appeals of
New York, the owner of an elevator for passengers is not
subject, so far at least as any part of the plant
Elevator,
other than that by which the elevator is moved
Injuryto
Passenger, and controlled is concerned, to the rules that
Liability of
apply to a railroad company in respect of its roadOwner
bed, engines, etc., and is not held bound to exercise the utmost care and diligence, and liable for the slightest

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

neglect; but if he exercises due diligence to provide a safe and
suitable car and other appliances for the operation of the
elevator and the accommodation of passengers, he is not liable
for an accident which could not with reasonable diligence have
been foreseen and provided against: McGrell v. Buffalo OF.-e
& Bdg. Co., 47 N..E. Rep. 305, reversing 35 N. Y. Suppl.
599.
While a witness may ordinarily testify to a conversation had
by him through a telephone with another person, though he is
not able to identify the voice of the person respondEvidence,
Telephone
ing, yet, when the latter is to be charged with
Mlessage
notice of the conversation, (as when it is sought to
charge an indorser of a promissory note with liability by a
notice of dishonor thus communicated,) it must clearly appear
that the one who answered was the one who is to be charged;
and therefore, when the only evidence of the giving of the
notice aforesaid was the testimony of a witness that he called
up the office of the indorser, and did not know whether or
not it was the indorser or his bookkeeper, or either of them,
that answered, it was held that the sustaining of a demurrer
to this testimony, on the gtound that it furnished no evidence
that notice of dishonor was given, was not error: C. C.
Thompson & Walkup Co. v. Appleby, (Court of Appeals of
Kansas, Southern Department, C. D.,) 48 Pac. Rep. 933.
Evidence as to a conversation carried on over a telephone
may be given by one who took part in it, if the other party
is sufficiently identified: e. g., when the witness testifies that
he knew and distinguished the voice of the person at the
other end of the telephone: Stepp v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep.
349, 1894. So, testimony that the one who spoke to the
witness gave his name, and that the witness went immediately
to the office of the person named, who admitted the conversation just had by telephone, sufficiently identifies the one who
spoke to the witness: William Deering & Co. v. Skumpik,
(Minn.,) 69 N. W. Rep. io88, 1897.
Further, one who heard the conversation, or only one side
of it, can testify to what he heard, if the person at the other
end of the instrument is identified; and consequently, when it
is admitted that the conversation was carried on between
plaintiff and defendant, one who heard one side of it can
testify, though he did not know of his own knowledge with
whom the conversation was held: Jiles v. Andrews, 153 Ill.
262, 1895.
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A false letter, purporting to have been written by another
with intent to influence the collector of customs to reject the
application of a Chinese subject to land, is not an
Forgery
instrument which could defraud, within Penal
Code Cal., § 470, defining forgery with such particularity
that, as the annotator says, " it was evidently intended to
cover every case that could arise:" People v. Wong Sam,
(Supreme Court of California,) 48 Pac. Rep. 972.
The fact that an insolvent's father, to whom he had transfered property in payment of a debt, organized a corporation
Fraudulent several months afterwards, and employed the
Conveyance insolvent therein at a moderate salary, does not
show a secret understanding in the transfer, when
the father is wealthy and liberal, and all the parties to the
transfer testify that it involved nothing but what appeared on
its face: Henderson v. Perryman, (Supreme Court of Alabama,)
22 So. Rep. 24.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
decided, that a tug engaged in towing barges from one port
to another is not bound up with them into a single
Oeneral
Average,
maritime adventure, so as to be subject to the law
Tug
of general average, even though her compensation
for the towage is measured by the freight carried by the
barges; and consequently the act of the tug in cutting loose
from them, and allowing them to go ashore, in order to save
herself from a like fate, will not subject her to a general average
contribution: The J. P. Donaldson, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 951,
reversing 21 Fed. Rep. 67 1.
When a criminal prosecution is threatened under color of
an invalid statute for the purpose of compelling
the relinquishment of a property right, the remedy
Against
Criminal
in equity is available, and a preliminary injunction
Proceedings may properly issue: Central Trust Co. of N. Y v.
Citizen's St. Ry. Co., (Circuit Court, D. Indiana,) 8o Fed.
Rep. 218.
inlunction,

Apprentice workmen, who have allowed their wages to
accumulate upon an agreement that they should
be paid at the end of their apprenticeship, have
Statutory
Preference,
no more extensive right to a preference upon the
Workmen, insolvency of the corporation by which they are
Apprentices employed, than have any other unpaid workmen
Insolvency,

in its employ, unless such a right is expressly conferred by
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statute: Mingin v. Alva Glass Mfg. Co., (Court of Chancery
of New Jersey, Grey, V. C.,) 37 Ati. Rep. 450.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently held that
Insurance,

a policy which insures against loss caused by

"accidental damage to or destruction of" property, "excepting only damage or destruction by
fire or lightning," covers a loss due to a flood:
Hey v. Guarantors' Liability Indemnity Co. of Pennsylvania,
37 Atl. Rep. 402.
Accidental
Lamage,

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has lately ruled (I) That
death caused by the sting of an insect is effected through
"external, violent and accidental" means, within
Accident
Insurance, the meaning of an accident insurance policy;
Deathfom (2) That the sting of an insect is the proximate
cause of' death resulting from blood-poisoning
caused by the sting; and (3)That a death from blood-poisoning caused by the sting of an insect is not the result of
"poison in any form or manner," or of "contact with poisonous substances," within the meaning of those terms in an
accident insurance policy: Omberg v. United States Mut.
Assn., 4o S. W. Rep. 909.
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department, has recently passed upon several questions arising
Credit
out of a credit insurance contract, holding (I) That
Insurance, under a credit insurance policy covering loss susPolicy,

tained by reason of the insolvency of debtors
owing the insured for merchandise sold between
September I, 1892, and September I, 1893, in excess of i3/4
per cent. on the total gross sales made during that period
"subject to the terms and conditions provided below and
attached hereto," to which was attached a rider providing that
it should cover all losses on sales made within one year preceding August 3 1, 1892, except such losses as the insured had
notice of before August 3 1, 1892, or where an extension had
been granted to the debtor, but providing for no deduction
from the gross sales made during that year, there should be
deducted, in computing the amount of loss, only i 34 per cent.
of the amount of sales made in the year beginning September
I, 1892; (2) That a conveyance by a debtor to a trustee for
distribution of the proceeds among specified creditors, reciting
in the conveyance that such goods are "only a part of his
Loss,

Computation

51t
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property," is not a "general assignment for the benefit of
creditors," within a credit insurance policy insuring against any
" loss sustained by reason of the insolvency of debtors" of the
insured, and defining such losses as those arising on sales by
the insured to persons who have made a general assignment
for the benefit of their creditors; and (3)That when a policy of
insurance against loss by reason of the insolvency of the debtors
of the insured limits the liability of the insurer to a specified
sum on any one loss, and provides in one clause that, when
only part of a loss is covered by the policy, "the proportionate
part of everything realized or secured by the indemnified shall
be credited to so much of the loss as is covered," and in another
that all payments and securities should be deducted before determining the insurer's percentage of loss, the former provision
is not affected by the latter, which merely provides for the
deduction of payments and securities without specifying the
mode thereof: Goodman v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co.
of N. Y., 45 N. Y. Suppl. 508.
In the opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey, a policy-holder in a credit insurance company, (which
Insolvency of insures traders against losses occurring through
Insurer,
the insolvency of their customers,) cannot recover
Subsequent for losses sustained after the company becomes
Losses
insolvent, whether the sales which led to the loss
were made before or after that date, but can only recover the
unearned premium, when there is no reserved value to the
policy, nor any method of reinsuring: Gray v. Reynolds,
37 Atl. Rep. 461.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recently declared that
it is a rule of fidelity insurance, (which amounts to a continuing suretyship for the faithful discharge of his
Fidelity
Insurance,
duties by a servant,) that if the master discovers
Notice of
that the servant has been guilty of dishonesty in
Dishonesty
the course of the service, and thereafter continues
him in that service, without notice to and the assent of the
surety, express or implied, to that course, the latter will not
be liable for any loss arising from the dishonesty of the servant during his subsequent service; but that this rule has no
application to mere breaches of duty or contract obligations on
the part of the servant, not involving dishonesty on his part or
fraud or concealment on the part of the master: Lancashire
Ins. Co. v. Callahan, 71 N. W. Rep. 26 1.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has at last settled
the long disputed question as to the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to fix rates Ifor carriage
Interstate
by railroad, holding that the powers of the cornCommerce
Commission, mission are judicial and administrative, but not
Powers,
legislative, and that, after having judicially deFixing Rate clared an existing rate of
tariff charged by a carrier to be unreasonable, it has no power to prescribe a rate to
control in the future, and to enforce its order by proceedings
in mandamus: Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896. Mr. Justice
Harlan dissented.
The Circuit Court for the Western District of Virginia has
lately held, that when an action is pending against a common
carrier to recover for the loss of a shipment of
Judgment,
Misconduct of cigars, and the quality and value of the cigars are
Jury,
in issue, the fact that the plaintiff conducted three
Relief
jurors to his agent's place of business, and gave
them a box of cigars, is sufficient ground for enjoining the
enforcement of the judgment: Platt v. Threadgill, 80 Fed.
Rep. 192.
A tenant of the third and fourth floors of a building, whose
water supply is cut off, furniture injured by dust apd lime,
Landlord and and ingress and egress interfered with, causing
Tenant,
damage, by the landlord's repairing the second
Quiet
floor, may recover from the landlord for breach
Enjoyment
of covenant of quiet enjoyment, irrespective of
his negligence: McDowell v. Hyman, (Supreme Court of California,) 48 Pac. Rep. 984.
The Vice-Chancellor for Ireland has recently decided, that
brick-clay, lying about fifteen inches beneath the surface, was
included in a reservation in a lease, reserving all
Lease,
Reservation mines of lead, ore, tin and other minerals, coal,
of Mines and and all quarries of marble, freestone, limestone,
Minerals,
Eiusers
and building stones, slates, and other quarries,
whatsoever, (save so much as might be used for
building or improvement on the premises,) as also
all marl, fuller's earth, . . . bogs, turf, mosses, and turbaries,
and giving the landlord power to bore, search for, dig, and
carry away bog, timber, mines, minerals, marble, coal, freestone,
marl, building stone, limestone and slate, fuller's earth, . . .
and turf: Shaftesbury v. Wallace, [1897] 1 I. R. 381.
Generls,
Brick-clay
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In Youmans v. Smith, (Court of Appeals of New York,)
47 N. E. Rep. 265, the counsel in a disbarment proceeding
Libel,
prepared a list of questions to be asked witnesses,
Privileced which might in certain contingencies be competent
tions
and material, and caused these questions to be
printed for submission to the witnesses in preparation for the
hearing. The respondent sued the printer for libel, and the
jury found for him, and this judgment was affirmed by the
general term: 25

N. Y. Suppl. 1130.

But the Court of

Appeals reversed the latter decision, holding that although a
printer who prints a libel and delivers the printed copies to
the author, knowing that he intends to submit them to others
to read, becomes liable as a publisher of the libel from the
moment that any third person reads it, provided the words
are not privileged, yet in the case in hand the questions,
though they contained matter defamatory of the plaintiff, were
privileged in the hands of the counsel and his agents, at least
while used solely for the purpose for which they were prepared; and that the printer was, therefore, not liable.
In Loiseau v. State, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 22 So.
Rep. 138, several persons each dropped nickels into a slot
Lottery,
Slot Machine

machine owned by the defendant, agreeing among

themselves that the one after whose play the ma-

chine should indicate the highest card hand should
have all the cigars that the nickels purchased. The defendant
furnished from his stock a nickel cigar for each nickel put into
*themachine, and delivered them to the person who obtained
the best hand. Upon these facts it was held, that the machine,
when put to such a use, was a lottery, which, under Const.
Ala. art. 4, § 26, the general assembly had no power to
legalize.

Mandamus will lie to compel the judge of an inferior
court to reinstate a criminal cause, which, for
Mandamus,
Reinstatement reasons insufficient in law, he has disconof SuIt
tinued: Ex parte State, (Supreme Court of
Alabama,) 22 So. Rep. 115.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas, the operator of an elevator in
Master and
Servant,
a hotel is a fellow-servant of a chambermaid who
Fellow-servant rides in the elevator in the discharge of her
duties: OrientalInvestment Co. v. Sline, 41 S. W. Rep. 130.
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The doctrine, that when a municipal incorporation is
wholly void ab initio, as being created without warrant of
law, it can create no debts and can incur no
Municipal
Corporations, liabilities, does not apply to the case of an irreirregular
gularly organized corporation, which has obOrganization, tained, by compliance with a general law authorI
..
Dissolution,
Reorganization, izing the formation of municipal corporations, an
Liability for organization valid as against everybody except
Debts
the state acting by direct proceedings. Such an
organization is merely voidable, and, if the state refrains from
acting until after debts are created, the obligations are not
destroyed by a dissolution of the corporation, but it will be
presumed that the state intended that they should be devolved
upon the new corporation which succeeded, by operation of
law, to the property and improvements of its predecessor:
Stapleigh v. City of San Antonio, (Supreme Court of the
United States,) 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957.
The Supreme Court of Montana has lately held that the
provisions of Comp. Stat. Mont. 1887, § 345, forbidding a
mayor to be interested directly or indirectly in
Contracts,
Interest of
the profits of any city contracts entered into
Officers
while he is in office, do not apply to the case of a
mayor who was not interested in a contract made with the
city, but who agreed, after the contract was accepted, and
filed with the proper official, to take stock in a corporation
which succeeded to the rights of the original contractors:
State v. Mayor, etc., of City of Great Falls,49 Pac. Rep. 15.
Under a charter which empowers a municipal corporation
to regulate the carrying on of any dangerous business, to
Ordinance,
make provision for the inspection of steam boilers,
Validity,
to license engineers using such boilers, and to
Engineers of provide for the election or appointment of officers
Steam Boilers required by the charter or authorized by ordinance,
the corporation has power, as a regulation for the public
safety, to pass an ordinance prohibiting the owners of steam
boilers from eniploying as engineer any person who has not
first obtained a permit from the boiler inspector, or a license
from the board of engineers, and providing for the appointment of such officers and for the punishment of a violation of
the ordinance: City of St. Louis v. F. Meyrose Lamp Mfg. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2,) 41 S. W. Rep.
244.
In the opinion of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey, an
abutting owner has the right to run electric wires above the
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Streets,
Rights of
Abutting
Owner

street for the purpose of connecting buildings on
his property with the wires alread yon polesin the
public streets lawfully erected for the purpose of
supplying lights, without asking permission of the

city; and the latter cannot enjoin the running of such wires
as a nuisance : Mayor, etc., of Borough of Brigantinev. Holland
Trust Co., 37 Atl. Rep.'438.
In an action by the next of kin to recover for the death of
one killed by a mob, as authorized by the law of Kansas,
(Gen. Stat. Kans. 1889, §§ 2590, 2591,) which
Action for
Death Caused makes incorporated cities and towns liable for
by Mob,
damages that accrue within the corporate limits in
Damages,
consequence of the action of mobs, the reputation
Evidence
and conduct of the deceased may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages, under the second section
of the act, which provides that "in all actions under the
preceding section the character, use or manner of occupancy of
the property lost and destroyed, and the reputation and conduct of the person injured, may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages;" and such testimony is not confined to
the general reputation of the deceased, but the defendant may
show any misconduct or crime, committed within a reasonable time prior to the killing, which may have influenced 'the
mob, or which would affect the value of his life to the next of
kin: Adams v. City of Salina, (Supreme Court of Kansas,) 48
Pac. Rep. 918.
Quare, whether the defendant could give in evidence, under
this ruling, prior declarations of the plaintiff that he wished
the deceased were dead?
According to a late decision of the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, Second Department, two persons,
Neglgenc, with a wagon, engaged in moving furniture, are
Imputable,
engaged in a joint venture, and the negligence of
Joint Venture one in the management of the wagon is imputable
to the other: Schron v. Staten Island Electric R. R. Co., 45
N. Y. Suppl. 124.
In a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals of
Ireland, Murphy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., [1897] 2 I. R.
301, a railway porter, in the employ of the deRailroad
fendant company, wheeled a barrow with luggage
Company,
Master and thereon to a side entrance to the defendant's
Servant
station at Derry, and left it standing close to the
top of the steps leading down to the public foot-path outside.
Some "badge-porters," (men who carried luggage from the
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station to the passenger's destination,) licensed by the corporation of Derry, but not employed by or subject to the
control of the defendant company, rushed up the steps-as
was usual when the constable whose duty it was to keep
them off the platform and to maintain order among them was
absent, as he was on this occasion-and in a struggle for the
luggage, upset the barrow and the trunks on it, which tumbled
down the steps and injured the plaintiff, a passenger, who was
waiting on the footpath below for his luggage to be brought
out. On these facts it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, since he had sued the defendant for the
negligence of its servant, and had at first attempted to prove
that the porter had himself wheeled the barrow over the steps.
This case furnishes an excellent instance of the evil results
of trying a case on a wrong theory. If the plaintiff had
charged that the company was negligent in permitting the
"badge-porters" to come on its premises and wrangle over
the luggage, it is difficult to see how it could have defended
successfully.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, (Division No. ,) in
Kingman v. Wauglh, 40 S. W. Rep. 884, has held the
St. Louis Daily Record to be a "daily newspaper,"
Newspapers,
Legal Notices within the meaning of the statutes relating to the
publication of legal notices. That paper was described as
follows: The St. Louis Daily Record "is printed and published in the English language in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, every day except Sunday; that said publication claims
on the face of it to be a newspaper devoted to the courts,
financial, real estate, building, and business interests of St.
Louis; that it is delivered each week-day morning, by carrier,
in the city of St. Louis, and in outlying districts of the city
by mail; that the subscription price is printed plainly upon
the paper, and is not nominal, but is adhered to; that it circulates throughout the city of St. Louis, and is not confined to
any particular trade, or calling, or business interest. It circulates generally among the lawyers, real-estate dealers, bankers,
brokers, money lenders, bond and stock dealers, real-estate
speculators and other property-holders.
It also circulates
extensively among material-men and builders, and those
interested in the construction of buildings and the improvement of real estate. It is taken to a considerable extent by
merchants, grocers, packing houses, provision dealers, wine
and liquor dealers, brewers, dry-goods merchants and commission merchants of the city of St. Louis. It contains daily
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what is claimed to be a complete list of all conveyances of
real estate within the city of St. Louis, and all deeds of trust,
releases of deeds of trust, chattel mortgages, permits issued for
improvements upon real estate, mechanics' liens, judgments
and transcripts affecting real estate, which occurred the -day
previous to the publication; notices of all real estate to be sold
by trustees under powers contained in deeds of trust; notices
of sales of real estate by administrators, executors, commissioners, or by other judicial processes, both in the city of
St. Louis and in St. Louis county. It contains a brief
minute of the proceedings of the Circuit Court of the city of
St. Louis, brief notices of all suits filed in said court, and the
setting of such cases for trial. It also contains quotations of
all principal stocks and bonds on the market in the city of
St. Louis, notices of assignments, bills of sale, notices of business failures and notices of corporations formed in St. Louis. It
also contains brief items of news of a general character. It
contains a number of commercial advertisements, and the
advertisements are not confined to any particular trade or
business. It contains, from time to time, advertisements of a
legal nature, such as notices of sales of real estate at auction,
by trustees under deeds of trust, and notices of stockholders'
meetings."
"It is a law of business that a manufacturer of any particular
line of products is also a dealer in that product, and that in
Partnership, the course of his business he is frequently comScope of
pelled by a multitude of orders which is beyond
Business,
his capacity or by derangement of machinery or
Implied
from other causes to become a purchaser of the
material he manufactures. That when firms do
so purchase, such purchases are within the scope of their line
of business cannot successfully be contested." Accordingly,
such a purchase by one partner binds the firm: Bulkley v.
Wood & Co., (Superior Court of Pennsylvania,) 4 Pa. Super.
Authority of
Partner

Ct. 391.

The pledgor of a note retains an equitable interest therein;
and hence, if the pledgee of a note deposited as collateral
security refuses to sue upon it when it becomes
Pledge,
Rights of
due, a bill will lie by the pledgor to have the note
Pledgor

collected, and the proceeds credited on his debt:

Baker v. Burkett, (Supreme Court of Mississippi,)

Rep. 970.

21

So.
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When relied upon to support a defence of false representations, newspaper advertisements, handbills and
printed prospectuses need not always be set out
in haec verba, (et imagines;) the rule requiring
the setting out of papers must have a reasonable
application: Max Meadows Land & Improvement Co. v. Mendin/jall, (Superior Court of Pennsylvania,) 4 Pa. Super.
Ct. 398.
Practice,
Affidavit
of Defence,
Setting out
Paper

A condition upon a cloak-room ticket issued by a railroad
company that it "will not be responsible for any
Railroad
package exceeding the value of £io," protects
Company,
Cloak-room, the company from liability, not only for the loss
of an article deposited in the cloak-room, but also
Exemption
-rom Liability for damage or injury thereto while in their
custody: Pratt v. Soutlz Eastern Ry. Co., (Queen's Bench
Division,) [1897] I Q. B. 718.
A judgment against a railroad company for a death occurMortgage, ring in the operation of the road cannot be fegarded as a necessary operating expense, and is
Priority of
Judgment
not entitled to priority of payment over a mortfor Death
gage upon that ground: New York Security &
Trust Co. v. Louisville, E. & St. L. C. R. R. Co., (Circuit
Court, Dist. Indiana,) 79 Fed. Rep. -386; though the death
occurred before the appointment of a receiver: Veatch v.
Amerian Loan & Trust Co., (Circuit Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit,) 79 Fed. Rep. 471.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has recently decided, that the entry of a nolle prosequi, by order of
Recognizance, court, on motion of the prosecutor, does not disDischarge,
charge from liability the sureties on a recognizance
Nolie
conditioned that the accused will first appear, and
Prosequi
stand to abide "the order and judgment of the
court in the premises, and in the second place, will not depart
the said court without leave," when it appears that he did
depart the court without leave: Weber v. State, 37 Atl. Rep.

133.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has declared that the
statute creating the state board of health does not give it
the power to prescribe vaccination as a condition
Schools,
Vaccination to admission to the public schools, that not being
expressly mentioned in the act; and that when the right to
attend school is given by statute to every child of proper age,
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and there is no express grant of authority to make vaccination a condition to attendance, neither boards of health nor
school boards can require it, if small pox does not exist in
the community, and there is no reason to apprehend that it is
approaching the vicinity of the school, or is likely to become
prevalent there: Potts v. Breen, 47 N. E. Rep. 8 I, affirming
6o Ill. App. 201.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has lately held, in accordancs with the general rule on the subject, that the relationship
between a parent and child, (in this case a father
Slander,
and daughter,) makes it his legal and moral duty
Qualified
Privilege,
to advise her as he thinks best for her welfare, and
Fthrand gives rise to a qualified privilege in giving that
advice; that this relation and the usual sympathy
among the friends of both, to whom the father's statements
are repeated, are such that the issue involved, when those
statements are relied on as the ground of an action for slander,
is not whether they were true, but whether the father honestly
believed them to be true; and that when these statements are
in reference to the character of one who sought the daughter
in marriage, they are not actionable merely because untrue,
but express malice must be proved: Baysset v. Hire, 22 So.
Rep. 44.
An envelope, and a letter which is proved to have been
inclosed in it, are so connected together that the
Statute
of Frauds,
envelope may be used to supply the name of one
Memorandum of the parties to the memorandum in writing
required by the Statute of Frauds: Pearce v. Gardner,(Court
of Appeal of England,) [1897] i Q. B. 688.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, following what seems
to be the drift of the Massachusetts cases, has lately held that
Taxation,
the water power created by the erection of a dam,
Water Power being, intangible and potential merely, is not an
element of taxable property, apart from that upon which it
operates; and should therefore be estimated in connection
with the mills which are run by it, and be taxed there, rather
than with the dam which creates it, and the land covered by
the water: Union Water Power Co. v. City of Auburn, 37 Atl.
Rep. 331.
Emery, J., clearly points out the fallacy in the argument of
the majority opinion, in a very forcible concurring opinion, in
which, after showing that the owner of the land may often
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acquire a practical monopoly of the water power of a stream,
he goes on to say: "This monopoly, thus valuable, is an
incident of the ownership of the land, and may often be the
principal element in the value of the land. Large revenues
may often accrue to the landowner solely from this monopoly.
This monopoly, this revenue or chance of revenue from it,
should be included in an estimate of the value of the land.
The whole value of the land, with all these incidents, is to be
assessed dnd taxed in the town in which the land is situated."
He arrived at the same conclusion as the rest of the court, on
the ground that the court below had done this.

In a case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Haveifo-rd Loan & Bldg. Assn. of Phila. v. Dougherty, 37 At.
Tenantsin
Rep. 179, a tenant in common obtained a loan,
Common,

giving mortgage security on the entire property,
and at his direction the mortgagee paid out of the
loan a prior mortgage on the property, both supposing that
the mortgagor was owner. On discovering the fact that he
was only co-tenant with others, the mortgagee brought suit
for subrogation and other equitable relief. The court below
dismissed the bill; but this decree was reversed by the
supreme court, which held that the mortgagor was entitled
to contribution, and to subrogation to the mortgage paid off;
and that the second mortgagee succeeded to this right of
subrogation.
Contribution,
Subrogation

According to a recent decision of the House of Lords, there
is no fiduciary relation between tenants in common of real
Purchase of estate, as such; and one tenant in common of real
Common
estate cannot impose upon his co-tenant an obligaProperty at
tion of a fiduciary character by leaving the manM~ortgage
Sale
agement of the property in his hands. Accordingly, one such tenant can purchase the property at a private
sale by the mortgagees, though he pays only the exact sum
due in respect of the principal, interest and costs, leaving the
bulk of the purchase money on the security of the property:
Kennedy v. DeTrafford, [1897] A. C. i8o, affirming [1896]
i Ch. 762.
But one tenant in common cannot acquire the common
property, when the sale is in pursuance of a scheme of the
purchaser to get possession of the land : Van Ormer v. Harley,
(Iowa,) 71 N. W. Rep. 241.
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It is not actionable for defendant, who sells
of goods as plaintiff, to threaten to discharge
they trade with plaintiff, and to
Torts,
their pay checks, made good for
Liability,
Injuring

Plaintiff's
Business

the same kind
its employes if
tell them that
merchandise at

its store, and non-transferable, will not be received

when they have passed through plaintiff's hands,
though such threats have the result intended, of

injuring plaintiff in his business: Robison v. Texas Pine Land
Assn., (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,) 40 S. W. Rep. 843.
When the same trade-mark has been appropriately used
without objection by each of the owners of two separate
Trade-mark, springs of water.having the same medicinal qualiInfringement, ties, they may jointly maintain an action to
Waters
enjoin a third person from using the trade-mark :
Nortlutt v. Turney, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 41

S. W. Rep. 2 1.

Kekewich, J., of the Chancery Division of the Supreme
Court of Judicature of England, has recently ruled, that the
principle

announced in Reddaway v. Banham,

[1896] A. C. 199, 204, 1896, that "nobody has
t
i
s.o
any right to represent his goods as the goods. of
somebody else," has no limit as regards name, origin, honesty
of manufacture or sale, or otherwise; and that a trader whose
goods have acquired a reputation under a particular name can
restrain the use of that name in any way whatever by a rival
trader in connection with the latter's own goods, even though
that reputation has been acquired by the exertions or enterprise of the rival trader as an importer and vender on behalf
of the plaintiff: Saxlehner v. Apollinaris Co., [1897] I Ch.
rade-Name,
Deception

893.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in four cases,
American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618, reversing
Trial by
IO Utah, 147, and Springfield City v. Thomas, 17
Jury,
Majority

Sup. Ct. Rep. 717, reversing 9 Utah, 426, Salt
Lake City Brewing Co. v. Fred. W. Wolf Co., 17

Sup. Ct. Rep. 717, reversing IO Utah, 179,
and
Salt Lake City v. Tucker, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717, reversing Io
Utah, 173, and overruling Hess v. White, 9 Utah, 61, 1893, has
held, that the statute of the territory of Utah, (Comp. L. Utah,
Verdict

§ 337 1, as amended by Laws, 1892, p. 46,) which authorizes a

verdict in all civil cases on the concurrence of nine members of
the jury, is invalid, because it impairs the common-law right of
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trial by jury secured to litigants by the act of congress extending the constitution and laws of the United States over
that territory, (9 Stat. at Large, 458, § I7,) and by the act
providing that in territorial courts no party shall be deprived.
of the right of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common
law, (18 Stat. at Large, 27, c. 8o,) and the seventh amendment to the constitution of the United States.
This leaves still open the question as to the constitutionality of such a statute when enacted by a state legislature,
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has applied the familiarprinciple of following trust funds to the case of money stolen
from a bank by its janitor; rejecting the doctrine
Trust,
which holds that property stolen by a mere serFollowing
Trust Funds, vant, not entrusted
vith any fiduciary duties,.
Stolen
cannot be thus recovered, and declaring it, with.
be
"indefensible
on authority;
much
reason,
to
Property
and opposed to the enlightened policy of modern equity
jurisprudence:" Nebraska Nat. Bk. v. Johnson, 71 N. W.
Rep. 294.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,, following
its prior decisions, holds that petroleum oil in place is part
of the land; and that its wrongful extraction.
Waste,
Life Tenant, by one lawfully in possession is waste, and.
Petroleum
an irreparable injury, which will be enjoined:.
Williamson v.Jones, 27 S. E. Rep. 41 .
When a testator devises and bequeaths his real and personal
Wills,
property to his wife, on condition that in no case.
shall she give or bequeath one cent of said estate
Conditional
to any member of his family or any relative of her
Bequest,
Restraint on own, the condition is against public policy and
void, being a restraint upon alienation:
Morse v.
Blood, (Supreme Court of Minnesota,) 71 N. W. Rep. 682.
When a will gives the estate of the testator in trust for thesupport of his wife and children, during her life, and after her
death to their support, in the discretion of theWil,
Construction,. trustees, until they are of age or marry, and, when
Renunciation all the children arrive at age or marry, to divide
the estate among the children, and, in the event of no child or
issue thereof, then to divide the estate among the brothers and'
sisters of the testator, a renunciation by the widow, and herelection to take against the will, is equivalent to her death, for-
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the purposes of distribution: Randall v. Randall, (Court of
Appeals of Maryland,) 37 Atl. Rep. 209.
When one who has been adjudged to be insane is offered as
a witness, the inquiry for the court in the preliminary examination is limited to his understanding of the obliWitnesses,
insane Person gations of an oath and ability to comprehend the
examination as a witness, and, if he can stand this
test, the effect of his alleged insanity upon his credibility is for
the jury: Wrigit v. Southern Express Co., (Circuit Court,
W. D. Tennessee, N. D.,) 80 Fed. Rep. 85.
The testimony of an insane person is to be rejected, if it
appears that his mind is so affected by his disease that his
testimony is unreliable: Armstrong v. Timmons, 3 Harr.
(Del.) 342, 1841 ; Livingston v. Kiersted, io Johns. (N. Y.)
362, 1813; Harifordv. Palmer, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 143, 1819;
Hoyt v. Adee, 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 173, 187o; but if it appears
that his insanity does not relate to the subject-matter of his
testimony, and that he can give an intelligible account of the
transaction in respect of which he is called upon to testify,
his testimony should be received, its credibility being for the
jury: Fennell v. Tait, i C., M. & R. 584, 1834; Reg. v. Hill,
5 Cox, Cr. Cas. 259, 1851; District of Columbia v. Armes,
107 U. S. 519, 1882 ; Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310,
1891; Walker v. State, 97 Ala. 85, 1892; Clements v.
McGinn, (Cal.) 33 Pac. Rep. 92o, 1893; Holcomb v. Holcomb,
28 Conn. 177, 1859; Mayor v. Caldwell, 81 Ga. 76, 1888;
Tuckerv. Shaw, 158 Ill. 326, 1895; Dicksonv. Waldron, 135
Ind. 507, 1893; Mead v. Harris, ioi Mich. 585, 1894;
People v.N. Y.Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 229, 1876;
Hand v. Burrows, 23 Hun, (N. Y.) 330, 188o; Coleman's
Case, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 865, 1874; contra, Lopez v. State, 30
Tex. App. 487, 1891.
Ardemus Stewart.

